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Abstract. Differential Privacy is one of the most prominent frameworks used to
deal with disclosure prevention in statistical databases. It provides a formal pri-
vacy guarantee, ensuring that sensitive information relative to individuals cannot
be easily inferred by disclosing answers to aggregate queries. If two databases
are adjacent, i.e. differ only for an individual, then the query should not allow to
tell them apart by more than a certain factor. This induces a bound also on the
distinguishability of two generic databases, which is determined by their distance
on the Hamming graph of the adjacency relation.
In this paper we explore the implications of differential privacy when the indis-
tinguishability requirement depends on an arbitrary notion of distance. We show
that we can naturally express, in this way, (protection against) privacy threats that
cannot be represented with the standard notion, leading to new applications of
the differential privacy framework. We give intuitive characterizations of these
threats in terms of Bayesian adversaries, which generalize two interpretations of
(standard) differential privacy from the literature. We revisit the well-known re-
sults stating that universally optimal mechanisms exist only for counting queries:
We show that, in our extended setting, universally optimal mechanisms exist for
other queries too, notably sum, average, and percentile queries. We explore vari-
ous applications of the generalized definition, for statistical databases as well as
for other areas, such that geolocation and smart metering.
1 Introduction
Differential privacy [1,2] is a formal definition of privacy which originated from the
area of statistical databases, and it is now applied in many other domains, ranging from
programming languages [3] to social networks [4] and geolocation [5].
Statistical databases are queried by analysts to obtain aggregate information about
individuals. It is important to protect the privacy of the participants in the database,
in the sense that it should not be possible to infer the value of an individual from the
aggregate information. This can be achieved by adding random noise to the answer.
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Because of the focus on the single individual as the unit of protection, differen-
tial privacy relies in a crucial way on the notion of two databases being adjacent,
i.e. differing only for an individual. A mechanism K is -differentially private if for
any two adjacent databases x, x′, and any property Z, the probability distributions
K(x),K(x′) differ on Z at most by e, namely, K(x)(Z) ≤ eK(x′)(Z). For two
non-adjacent databases, there is no requirement other than the one induced by the tran-
sitive application of the property. Note that the set of all possible databases, together
with the adjacency relation, forms a Hamming graph, and the graph distance dh(x, x′)
between x and x′ is exactly the number of individuals in which x and x′ differ. Then,
for any databases x, x′, it is easy to see (by transitivity on a path from x to x′) that
K(x)(Z) ≤ edh(x,x′)K(x′)(Z). We can view dh(x, x′) as the distinguishability level
between two generic databases x, x′: the smaller dh(x, x′) is, the more similar the
probability distributions K(x), K(x′) are required to be.
When the sensitive information to be protected is other than the value of a single
individual, it is common to consider different notions of adjacency. For example, in
cases of cohesive groups with highly correlated values, we could consider adjacent
two databases differing in any number of individuals of the same group. Similarly,
when dealing with friendship graphs in social networks, adjacency could be defined
as differing in a single edge.
We argue that in some situations the distinguishability level between x and x′ should
depend not only on the number of different values between x and x′, but also on the
values themselves. We might require, for instance, databases in which the value of an
individual is only slightly modified to be highly indistinguishable, thus protecting the
accuracy by which an analyst can infer an individual’s value.
More generally, we might want to apply differential privacy in scenarios when x, x′
are not databases at all, but belong to an arbitrary domain of secrets X . In such a sce-
nario, there might be no natural notion of adjacency, but it is still reasonable to define
a distinguishability level between secrets, and employ the same principle of differential
privacy – i.e. the smaller the distinguishability level between x, x′ is, the more similar
the probability distributions K(x), K(x′) are required to be – to obtain a meaningful
notion of privacy. For instance, when dealing with geographic locations (aka, geoloca-
tion), it might be acceptable to disclose the fact that an individual is in Paris rather than
in New York. However, disclosing the precise location of the individual within Paris
is likely to be undesired (because, for instance, the individual is currently in Moulin
Rouge rather than in his office in Place d’Italie). Thus it would be useful to have a
distinguishability level that depends on the geographical distance.
In this paper we assume that we have a numeric function ε(x, x′), giving the dis-
tinguishability level between x, x′, which depends on the application at hand and the
privacy guarantees we wish to express. The corresponding notion of privacy is the re-
quirement that for an arbitrary pair x, x′ we have
K(x)(Z) ≤ eε(x,x′)K(x′)(Z)
Note that standard -differential privacy is a particular case of this notion, that we obtain
by setting ε(x, x′) =  dh(x, x′).
Since ε models distinguishability, there are some properties that it is expected to
satisfy. First, it should be the case that any element is indistinguishable from itself, i.e.
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ε(x, x) = 0. Second, the distinguishability level of x and x′ should be the same as that
of x′ and x, i.e. ε(x, x′) = ε(x′, x) (symmetry). Finally, if x1 and x2 are hardly distin-
guishable from x3, then they should be also hardly distinguishable from each other. In
other words, ε(x1, x2) should be bounded by a function of ε(x1, x3), ε(x2, x3). In this
paper we assume the triangle inequality, namely ε(x1, x2) ≤ ε(x1, x3) + ε(x3, x2),
which means that ε is a metric. We believe that more relaxed notions of distinguisha-
bility could potentially be useful, we leave the investigation of this possibility as future
work.4 In the rest of this paper we use d (for “distance”) instead of ε, and we call the
corresponding privacy notion “d-privacy”.
Similarly to the standard definition, d-privacy does not explicitly talk about the ad-
versary’s gain of knowledge. In order to better understand a privacy property, however,
it is useful to provide interpretations that directly reason about the capabilities of the
adversary. Two such interpretations exist for differential privacy: the first states that,
regardless of side knowledge, the adversary’s gain of knowledge by observing the re-
ported answer is the same whether or not the individual’s data were included in the
database [1,6]. The second states that, an informed adversary who already knows all
values except individual’s i, gains no extra knowledge from the reported answer, re-
gardless of side knowledge about i’s value [2].5
In the case of d-privacy, we provide two results that generalize the above interpre-
tations, showing the privacy guarantees provided by a certain metric d. The first uses
the concept of a hiding function φ : X → X . The idea is that φ can be applied to a
secret x before the mechanism K, so that the latter has only access to a hidden version
φ(x), instead of the real secret x. Then d-privacy implies that the adversary’s conclu-
sions (captured by his posterior distribution) are similar (up to a factor depending on φ)
regardless of whether φ is applied to the secret or not. Moreover, we show that certain
classes of hiding functions are “canonical”, in the sense that if the property holds for
those functions, it must hold in general.
The above characterization compares two posterior distributions and does not im-
ply that the adversary learns no information, but that he learns the same regardless of
whether the secret has been hidden or not. We then give a second characterization, com-
paring the adversary’s conclusions (a posterior distribution) to his initial knowledge (a
prior distribution). Since some information is allowed to be revealed, we cannot expect
the two to be similar. Still, if we restrict to a neighborhood N of secrets that are close
to each other, we can show that d-privacy implies that an informed adversary, knowing
that the secret belongs to N , can gain little more information about the exact secret,
regardless of his prior knowledge within N . Similarly to the previous characterization,
we also show that certain classes of neighborhoods are canonical.
We give examples of privacy problems in various contexts, and show how to define
appropriate metrics. In the context of statistical databases, we consider metrics that
4 Several of our results do not actually depend on ε being a metric.
5 The knowledge increase of a non-informed adversary is not bounded by e. Recalling the well-
known example from [1], consider the side information that Terry Gross is two inches shorter
than the average Lithuanian woman. Then obtaining the average height (even a noisy one)
gives little additional information about Terry Gross to an informed adversary, but substantial
information to a non-informed one.
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depend not only on the number of different values, but also on the values themselves.
First, a stronger variant of differential privacy is given in which databases differing in
a single individual are hardly distinguishable, but the distinguishability level becomes
even lower when the difference in the values is small. Moreover, this metric can be
relaxed to obtain a privacy notion that focuses on protecting the accuracy of a value.
This can be useful, for instance, in case an individual does not mind disclosing his age
group, but wants to protect his exact birthday date (such precise information could in
principle allow to identify the individual with little margin of error).
Departing from statistical databases, we consider smart meters, and the problem
for privacy that can derive from accurate measurement of energy consumption at high
frequency. Further, we consider the problem of hiding the exact position in location-
based services. In all these examples, besides the proper metric notion, we construct
also the canonical adversary which provides the operational interpretation.
Next, we turn our attention to the notion of utility, namely the accuracy of the re-
ported answer, and in particular the Bayesian notion of utility [7,8], which takes into
account the prior knowledge of the user. In general mechanisms may provide different
degrees of utility for the same level of privacy, and obviously it is desirable to identify
the optimal ones. Of particular interest are the universally optimal mechanisms, which
provide optimal utility for all users (i.e., all priors). There are two well known results
concerning universal optimality: the first [7] establishes that for counting queries the ge-
ometric and the truncated geometric mechanisms are universally optimal. The second
[8] says that for any other kind of query no universally optimal mechanism exists.
We revisit these results in our framework and show that in contrast to the standard
case, d-privacy allows to construct (for certain metrics) universally optimal mechanisms
for many other kinds of queries. More precisely, we show that universally optimal mech-
anisms exist in the cases of (i) the sum, average and percentile queries for the Manhattan
metric, and (ii) the average and percentile queries for the Maximum metric.
We also study the additional noise required to achieve privacy for databases queries,
when we use a finer metric than the Hamming distance. Surprisingly, it turns out that in
the case (i) above, the sensitivity of the queries remains the same as in the standard case.
This means that, a standard -differentially private mechanism already incorporates “for
free” the additional protection w.r.t. proximity of values.
Related Work. Several works in the differential privacy literature consider adjacency
relations different than the standard one, effectively using a metric tailored to that ap-
plication. Examples include group privacy [1] and edge privacy for graphs [9].
The generalization of differential privacy to arbitrary metrics was considered also
in [10,3]. In those works, however, the purpose of extending the definition was to ob-
tain compositional methods for proving differential privacy in programming languages,
while in our work we focus on the implications of such extension for the theory of dif-
ferential privacy. Namely, we aim at obtaining new meaningful definitions of privacy
for various contexts through the use of different metrics (cf. the examples of the smart
meters and of geolocation), and at investigating the existence of optimal mechanisms.
Another work closely related to ours is [11] in which an extended definition of
differential privacy is used to capture the notion of fairness in classification. A metric d
is used to model the fact that certain individuals are required to be classified similarly,
4
and a mechanism satisfying d-privacy is considered fair, since it produces similar results
for similar individuals. We view fairness as one of the many interesting notions that can
be obtained through the use of metrics in various contexts, thus it encourages our goal of
studying d-privacy. With respect to the actual metrics used in this paper, the difference
is that we consider metrics that depend on the individuals’ values, while [11] considers
metrics between individuals.
Contribution. The main contributions of this paper are summarized below:
– We study d-privacy – an extension of differential privacy to arbitrary domains en-
dowed with a metric d – in the general case, independently from any specific metric.
– We give two operational characterizations of d-privacy that directly constraint the
capabilities of the adversary.
– We show examples of applications of d-privacy to privacy scenarios both in databases
and in other contexts.
– We show that several queries (including the sum, average and percentile) admit uni-
versally optimal mechanisms for certain metrics. This contrasts sharply with stan-
dard differential privacy, where such mechanisms exist only for counting queries.
Plan of the Paper. In the next section we recall some preliminary notions about mech-
anisms, metrics, and differential privacy. Section 3 introduces the notion of d-privacy
and presents two characterization results. In Section 4 we give a sufficient and necessary
condition for the privacy of an oblivious mechanism, we discuss Laplace mechanisms,
and we give sufficient conditions for a mechanism to be optimal. In Sections 5 and 6
we give several examples of applications of our notions, in statistical databases with an
enriched notion of privacy, and in other domains, respectively. We also show how to
construct universally optimal mechanisms for some of those examples in the cases of
sum, average, and percentile queries. Section 7 concludes.
All proofs can be found in the appendix.
2 Preliminaries
Mechanisms. Given two sets X and Z , let FZ be a σ-algebra over Z and let P(Z) be
the set of probability measures over Z . A mechanism from X to Z is a (probabilistic)
function K : X → P(Z). A mechanism K can be described in terms of probability
density functions (pdf’s), that is by a function D : X → D(Z) (where D(Z) denotes
the space of the pdf’s over Z), such that D(x) is the pdf of K(x).
The composition H ◦ f of a deterministic function f : X → Y (called a query)
and a mechanism H : Y → P(Z) is the mechanism K : X → P(Z) defined as
K(x) = (H ◦ f)(x) = H(f(x)). Mechanisms of this form are called oblivious.
Let pi be a discrete probability measure on X , called a prior.6 Starting from pi and
using Bayes’ rule, each observation Z ∈ Z of a mechanism K : X → P(Z) induces a
posterior measure σ = Bayes(pi,K,Z) onX , defined as σ(x) = K(x)(Z)pi(x)∑
x′∈X K(x′)(Z)pi(x′)
.
6 We restrict to discrete priors for simplicity; all results could be carried to the continuous case.
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Metrics. A metric on a set X is a function dX : X 2 → [0,∞] such that dX (x, y) = 0 iff
x = y, dX (x, y) = dX (y, x), and dX (x, z) ≤ dX (x, y) + dX (y, x) for all x, y, z ∈ X .
The diameter of A ⊆ X is defined as dX (A) = supx,x′∈A dX (x, x′).
A sequence x1, . . . , xn is called a chain from x1 to xn and denoted by x˜. The length
dX (x˜) of a chain is defined as dX (x˜) =
∑n−1
i=1 dX (xi, xi+1). If dX (x˜) = dX (x1, xn)
then x˜ is called tight.
Of particular interest are metrics induced by a graph (X ,∼X ), where ∼X is the
graph’s adjacency relation. In the induced metric, dX (x, x′) is the length of the shortest
path from x to x′ (or infinite if no path exists). Of great interest are also the Man-
hattan (or L1), the Euclidean (or L2) and the Maximum (or L∞) metrics, denoted by
d1, d2, d∞ respectively. The numerical distance on the reals (which coincides with all
d1, d2, d∞) will be denoted by dR for clarity. Finally, of great interest is the metric
dP on P(Z) defined as dP(µ1, µ2) = supZ∈FZ | ln µ1(Z)µ2(Z) | with the convention that
| ln µ1(Z)µ2(Z) | = 0 if both µ1(Z), µ2(Z) are zero and∞ if only one of them is zero.
Differential Privacy. We fix a finite domain of values V , called the universe. A database
x ∈ Vn consists of n records from V - each corresponding to an individual - that is x
is a tuple 〈x[1], . . . , x[n]〉, x[i] ∈ V , where x[i] is the value of the i-th individual in the
database. We denote by x[v/i] the database obtained from x by substituting the value v
for individual i. The case when individuals are allowed to be absent from the database
can be modeled by the universe V∅ = V∪{∅}where the null value∅ denotes absence.
A crucial notion for differential privacy is that of adjacency: two databases x, x′ are
adjacent, written x ∼h x′, if they differ in exactly one element. Let dh be the distance
induced by ∼h (i.e., dh(x, x′) is the number of elements in which x, x′ differ). The
graph (Vn,∼h) is known as Hamming graph, and dh as Hamming distance.
Let Z be a set of query outcomes; a mechanism K : Vn → P(Z) satisfies -dif-
ferential privacy if adjacent databases produce answers with probabilities that differ at
most by a factor e:
K(x)(Z) ≤ e K(x′)(Z) ∀x ∼h x′ ∈ Vn, Z ∈ FZ (1)
Following [3], the definition can be expressed as dP(K(x),K(x′)) ≤  for all x ∼h x′.
Moreover, as explained in the introduction, we can rewrite it in terms of the Hamming
distance: dP(K(x),K(x′)) ≤ dh(x, x′) for all x, x′ ∈ Vn.
A desirable feature of this definition is that it solely depends on the mechanism it-
self, without explicitly talking about the adversary’s side knowledge, or the information
that he learns from the reported answer. However, in order to get a better understanding
of a privacy definition, it is useful to give an “operational” (or “semantic”) interpre-
tation that directly restricts the abilities of the adversary. To this end, we capture the
adversary’s side knowledge by a prior distribution pi on Vn, and his conclusions after
observing Z by the posterior distribution σ = Bayes(pi,K,Z).
There are two operational interpretations commonly given to differential privacy.
The first can be informally stated as: “regardless of side knowledge, by observing the
reported answer an adversary obtains the same information whether or not the indi-
vidual’s data were included in the database”. This can be formalized as follows: con-
sider a hiding function φi,v : Vn → Vn replacing i’s value by a fixed value v, i.e.
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φi,v(x) = x[
v/i], and let Φh = {φi,v | i ∈ 1..n, v ∈ V} be the set of all such functions.
The mechanism K ◦ φi,v behaves as K after removing i’s value; hence we require the
posterior distributions induced byK,K ◦φi,v to be similar. The resulting notion (called
“semantic privacy” in [6])7 can be shown to be implied by differential privacy.
Theorem 1 ([6]). If a mechanism K : Vn → P(Z) satisfies -differential privacy then
for all priors pi on Vn, all φ ∈ Φh, and all Z ∈ FZ :
dP(σ1, σ2) ≤ 2 where σ1 = Bayes(pi,K,Z) and σ2 = Bayes(pi,K ◦ φ,Z)
Note that the above interpretation compares two posterior measures. This requirement
does not imply that the adversary learns no information, but that he learns the same
regardless of the presence of the individual’s data. Both σ1, σ2 can be very different
than the prior pi, as the well-known example of Terry Gross [1] demonstrates.
A different interpretation can be obtained by comparing the posterior σ to the prior
distribution pi. Of course, we cannot expect those to be similar, since some information
is allowed to be disclosed. Still, we can require the distributions to be similar when
restricted to the value of a single individual, by assuming an informed adversary who
knows all other values in the database. Let Ni(x) = {x[v/i] | v ∈ V} denote the set of
databases obtained from x by modifying i’s value, and let Nh = {Ni(x) | x ∈ Vn, i ∈
1..n}. Knowing that the database belongs to a set N ∈ Nh means that we know all
values except one. We denote by pi|N the distribution obtained from pi by restricting to
N , i.e. pi|N (x) = pi(x|N). Requiring pi|N , σ|N to be similar brings us the definition of
“semantic security” from [2], which is a full characterization of differential privacy.
Theorem 2 ([2]). A mechanism K : Vn → P(Z) satisfies -differential privacy iff for
all priors pi on Vn, all N ∈ Nh, and all Z ∈ FZ :
dP(pi|N , σ|N ) ≤  where σ = Bayes(pi,K,Z)
Note that if the adversary does not know N ∈ Nh, then his knowledge can (and will in
most cases) be increased. Note also that the above result does not imply that K allows
the adversary to learn Ni(x)! In fact, this is clearly forbidden since it would violate the
same condition for Nj(x), j 6= i, i.e. it would violate the other individuals’ privacy.
3 Generalized Privacy
As discussed in the introduction, differential privacy can be generalized to the case of
an arbitrary set of secrets X , equipped with a metric dX .
Definition 1. A mechanism K : X → P(Z) satisfies dX -privacy, iff ∀x, x′ ∈ X :
dP(K(x),K(x′)) ≤ dX (x, x′), or equivalently:
K(x)(Z) ≤ edX (x,x′) K(x′)(Z) ∀Z ∈ FZ
7 The only difference between the semantic privacy of [6] and our formulation is that an “addi-
tive” metric between distributions is used instead of the “multiplicative” dP .
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Intuitively, the definition requires that secrets close to each other wrt dX , meaning
hardly distinguishable, should produce outcomes with similar probability. This is the
same core idea as in differential privacy, which can be retrieved as X = Vn, dX = dh.
Note that Definition 1 contains no ; the distinguishability level is directly given by
the metric. In practice, the desired metric can be obtained from a standard one by scaling
by a proper factor  (recall that a scaled metric is also a metric). For instance, in the case
of standard differential privacy, the Hamming distance between adjacent databases is 1,
and we want their distinguishability level to be , hence we use the scaled version dh.
Note also that an extended metric (allowing dX (x, x′) =∞) can be useful in cases
when we allow two secrets to be completely distinguished. The understanding of Defi-
nition 1 is that the requirement is always satisfied for those secrets. Similarly, pseudo-
metrics (allowing dX (x, x′) = 0 for x 6= x′) could be useful when we want some
secrets to be completely indistinguishable (forcing K(x) and K(x′) to be identical).
To simplify the presentation, the results of this paper assume an extended metric (but
not pseudo). An approximate version of dX -privacy can be defined, similarly to (α, δ)
differential privacy [13]. We leave the study of such notion as future work.
Different metrics dX , dX ′ on the same set X clearly give rise to different privacy no-
tions. The “strength” of each notion depends on the distinguishability level assigned to
each pair of secrets; dX -privacy and dX ′-privacy are in general incomparable. However,
lower distinguishability level implies stronger privacy.
Proposition 1. If dX ≤ dX ′ (point-wise) then dX -privacy implies dX ′-privacy.
For example, some works consider an adjacency relation ∼r slightly different than
∼h, defined as x ∼r x′ iff x′ = x[∅/i] (or vice versa), i.e. x′ can be obtained from x by
removing one individual. This relation gives rise to a metric dr for which it holds that:
1
2dr ≤ dh ≤ dr. From Proposition 1, the two models are essentially equivalent; one
can obtain dr-privacy from dh-privacy by doubling  and vice versa.
Characterization 1. Similarly to standard differential privacy, dX -privacy does not ex-
plicitly talk about the adversary’s gain of knowledge. To better understand the privacy
guarantees provided by a certain metric dX , it is useful to directly reason about the ca-
pabilities of the adversary. Two such characterizations are given, generalizing the two
interpretations of standard differential privacy (Theorems 1,2).
The first characterization uses the concept of a hiding function φ : X → X . The idea
is that φ can be applied to x before the mechanism K, so that the latter has only access
to a hidden version φ(x), instead of the real secret x. Let dX (φ) = supx∈X dX (x, φ(x))
be the maximum distance between a secret and its hidden version. We can show that
dX -privacy implies that the adversary’s conclusions (captured by his posterior measure)
are the same (up to 2dX (φ)) regardless of whether φ is applied or not. Moreover, we
show that certain classes of hiding functions are “canonical”, in the sense that if the
property holds for those, it must hold in general. We start be defining this class.
Definition 2. Let Φ be a set of functions from X to X , called hiding functions. A chain
x˜ is called a maximal Φ-chain iff for every step i there exists φ ∈ Φ s.t. φ(xi) =
xi+1, φ(xi+1) = xi and dX (xi, xi+1) = dX (φ). Then Φ is called maximally tight wrt
dX iff ∀x, x′ ∈ X there exists a tight maximal Φ-chain from x to x′.
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Note that the above property requires hiding functions that swap the secrets xi, xi+1.
This is not satisfied by the hiding functions φi,v introduced in the previous section, but
will be satisfied by more general functions used later in the paper.
Theorem 3. Let Φ be a set of hiding functions. If K satisfies dX -privacy then for all
φ ∈ Φ, all priors pi on X , and all Z ∈ FZ :
dP(σ1, σ2) ≤ 2 dX (φ) where σ1 = Bayes(pi,K,Z) and σ2 = Bayes(pi,K ◦φ,Z)
If Φ is maximally tight then the converse also holds.
The above characterization compares two posterior distributions; hence, it does not
impose that the adversary gains no information, but that this information is the same
regardless of whether φ has been applied to the secret or not.
Characterization 2. A different approach is to compare the adversary’s prior and pos-
terior distributions, measuring how much he learned about the secret. Since we allow
some information to be revealed, we cannot expect these distributions to be similar.
Still, if we restrict to a neighborhood N of secrets that are close to each other, we can
show that dX -privacy implies that an informed adversary, knowing that the secret be-
longs toN , can gain little more information about the exact secret regardless of his side
knowledge about N . Moreover, similarly to the previous characterization, we show that
certain classes of neighborhoods are “canonical”.
Definition 3. Let N ⊆ 2X . The elements of N are called neighborhoods. A chain x˜ is
called a maximalN -chain iff for every step i there existsN ∈ N such that {xi, xi+1} ⊆
N and dX (xi, xi+1) = dX (N). ThenN is called maximally tight wrt dX iff ∀x, x′ ∈ X
there exists a tight maximal N -chain from x to x′.
Theorem 4. Let N ⊆ 2X . If K satisfies dX -privacy then for all N ∈ N , all priors pi
on X , and all Z ∈ FZ :
dP(pi|N , σ|N ) ≤ dX (N) where σ = Bayes(pi,K,Z)
If N is maximally tight then the converse also holds.
Using meaningful (and maximally tight) sets Φ,N , and applying the above char-
acterizations, we can get an intuitive understanding of the privacy guarantees offered
by dX -privacy. For example, in the case of databases, it can be shown that Nh is maxi-
mally tight wrt the dh metric, hence the characterization of Theorem 2 can be obtained
as a special case of Theorem 4. Theorem 1 can also be obtained from Theorem 3 (even
though Φh is not maximally tight) since it only states an implication in one direction.
4 Answering Queries
To obtain the answer to a query f : X → Y in a private way, we can compose it
with a mechanism H : Y → P(Z), thus obtaining an oblivious mechanism H ◦ f :
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z1 z2
y1 3/4 1/4
y2 1/2 1/2
y3 1/4 3/4
Fig. 1. Counterexample to the converse of Fact 5. The table represents the distribution H . We
note that H ◦ f satisfies (ln 2)-privacy, and that f is 1-sensitive. However H(y1)(z1) = 3/4 6≤
2H(y3)(z1) = 2 1/4, hence H does not satisfy (ln 2)-privacy.
X → P(Z). In this section, we first state the standard compositionality result about
the privacy of H ◦ f , relying on the notion of ∆-sensitivity (aka Lipschitz continuity),
naturally extended to the case of dX -privacy. Then, we introduce the concept of uniform
sensitivity, and we use it to obtain the converse of the aforementioned compositionality
result, which in turn allows to give optimality results later in the paper.
Definition 4. f is ∆-sensitive wrt dX , dY iff dY(f(x), f(x′)) ≤ ∆dX (x, x′) for all
x, x′ ∈ X . The smallest such ∆ (if exists) is called the sensitivity of f wrt dX , dY .
Fact 5. Assume that f is∆-sensitive wrt dX , dY andH satisfies dY-privacy. ThenH ◦f
satisfies ∆dX -privacy.
Note that it is common to define a family of mechanisms H,  > 0, instead of
a single one, where each H satisfies privacy for a scaled version dY of a metric of
interest dY . Given such a family and a query f , we can define a family of oblivious
mechanisms K = H/∆ ◦ f,  > 0, each satisfying dX -privacy (from Fact 5).
The converse of the above result does not hold in general, see Fig. 1 for a coun-
terexample. However, it does hold if we replace the notion of sensitivity by the stronger
notion of uniform sensitivity.
Definition 5. Two elements y, y′ ∈ Y are called∆-expansive iff dY(y, y′) = ∆dX (x, x′)
for some x ∈ f−1(y), x′ ∈ f−1(y′). A chain y˜ is ∆-expansive iff all steps yi, yi+1
are ∆-expansive. Finally, f is uniformly ∆-sensitive iff it is ∆-sensitive and for all
y, y′ ∈ Y there exists a tight and ∆-expansive chain from y to y′.
Theorem 6. Assume that f is uniformly ∆-sensitive wrt dX , dY . Then H satisfies dY-
privacy if and only if H ◦ f satisfies ∆dX -privacy.
4.1 Laplace Mechanisms
Adding Laplace noise is the most widely used technique for achieving differentia pri-
vacy. The mechanism can be naturally adapted to any metric, using a variant of the ex-
ponential mechanism [14], by providing a properly constructed scaling function. Note
that in the framework of d-privacy, we can express the privacy of the mechanism itself,
on its own domain, without the need to consider a query or a notion of sensitivity.
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(i) Y ⊂ R, Z = R dY = dR λ(z) = 
2
(ii) Y ⊂ R2, Z = R2 dY = d2 λ(z) = 
2
2pi
(iii) Y ⊂ R2, Z = R2 dY = d1 λ(z) = 
2
4
(iv) Y = Z = q[0..k] dY = dR λ(z) =

eq
eq+1
z ∈ {0, qk}
eq−1
eq+1
0 < z < qk
Fig. 2. Instantiations of the Laplace mechanism
Definition 6. LetY,Z be two sets, and let dY be a metric onY∪Z . Let λ : Z → [0,∞)
be a scaling function such that D(y)(z) = λ(z) e−dY(y,z) is a pdf for all y ∈ Y (i.e.∫
Z D(y)(z)dν(z) = 1). Then the mechanism L : Y → P(Z), described by the pdf D,
is called a Laplace mechanism from (Y, dY) to Z .
Fact 7 ([14]). Any Laplace mechanism from (Y, dY) to Z satisfies dY-privacy.
Figure 4.1 provides instantiations of the general definition for various choices of
Y,Z and dY used in the paper, by properly adjusting λ(z). The basic case (i) is that of
the one-dimensional continuous Laplace mechanism. Similarly, we can define a two-
dimensional continuous Laplace mechanism (used in Section 6.2), measuring the dis-
tance between points by either the Euclidean (ii) or the Manhattan (iii) metric. In the
discrete setting, we obtain the Truncated Geometric mechanism TG [7], given by (iv),
using a quantized set of reals as input. We denote by q[0..k] the set {qi | i ∈ 0..k}, i.e.
the set of k + 1 quantized reals with step size q > 0.
4.2 Mechanisms of Optimal Utility
Answering a query privately is useless if the consumer gets no information about the
real answer, thus it is crucial to analyze the mechanism’s utility. We consider consumers
applying Bayesian inference to map the mechanism’s output to a guess that minimizes
their expected loss. A consumer is characterized by a prior pi on the set of secrets, and
a loss function l (assumed to be monotone wrt a metric of reference, which is always
dR for the needs of this paper). The utility U(H,pi, l) of a mechanism H for such a
consumer is given by the expected loss (under an optimal remap strategy). This is the
Bayesian notion of utility [7], but our results can be extended to risk-averse consumers.
A natural question to ask, then, is whether, for a given query f , there exists a mech-
anism that universally (i.e. for all priors and loss functions) provides optimal utility. Let
Hf (dX ) be the set of all mechanisms H : Y → Z (for any Z) such that H ◦ f satisfies
dX -privacy. All mechanisms in Hf (dX ) can be used to answer f privately, hence we
are interested in the one that maximizes utility.
Definition 7. A mechanism H ∈ Hf (dX ) is f -dX -optimal iff U(H,pi, l) ≥ U(H ′, pi, l)
for all H ′ ∈ Hf (dX ), all priors pi and all loss functions l.
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The existence of (universally) optimal mechanisms is far from trivial. For standard
differential privacy, a well-known result from [7] states that such a mechanism does
exist for counting queries, i.e. those of the form “how many users satisfy property P ”.
Theorem 8 ([7]). Let Y = [0..k] and let f : Vn → Y be a counting query. Then the
TG mechanism with input Y is f -dh-optimal for all  > 0.
On the other hand, a well-known impossibility result [8] states that counting queries
are essentially the only ones for which an optimal mechanism exists. This result is based
on the concept of the induced graph ∼f of a query f : Vn → Y , defined as: y ∼f y′ iff
∃x ∼h x′ s.t. f(x) = y, f(x′) = y′.
Theorem 9 ([8]). Let f : Vn → Y be a query such that ∼f is not a path graph. Then
no f -dh-optimal mechanism exists for any  < ln 2.
Thus, most interesting queries, e.g. the sum and average, have no optimal mechanisms.
However, the above negative result and the concept of the induced graph are tied
to the Hamming metric dh. This raises the question of whether this special status of
counting queries holds for any metric dX . To answer this question, we give a sufficient
condition for showing the optimality of TG for an arbitrary query f and metric dX ,
based on the concept of uniform sensitivity.
Theorem 10. Let Y = q[0..k] and assume that f : X → Y is uniformly ∆-sensitive
wrt dX , dR. Then the TG mechanism with input Y is f -∆dX -optimal.
In the following sections we show that this condition is indeed satisfied by several
important queries, including the sum and average, for various metrics of interest.
5 Privacy in Statistical Databases
In this section, we investigate privacy notions in the context of statistical databases,
other than the standard differential privacy. In contrast to the Hamming distance, which
can be defined independently from the structure of the universe V , we are interested
in metrics that depend on the actual values and the distance between them. To this
end, we assume that the universe is equipped with a metric dV , measuring how far
apart two values are. When the universe is numeric (i.e. V ⊂ R) then dV = dR is the
natural choice. In the case of null values, we can extend a metric dV from V to V∅ by
considering ∅ to be maximally distant from all other values, that is taking dV(∅, v) =
dV(V), v ∈ V . Note that this construction preserves the maximum distance between
values, i.e. dV(V∅) = dV(V).
The first metric we consider, the normalized Manhattan metric, allows to strengthen
differential privacy, obtaining a notion that not only protects the value of an individual,
but also offers higher protection to small modifications of a value. Then we relax this
metric, to obtain a weaker notion, that only protects the “accuracy” of an individual’s
value, but offers higher utility.
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5.1 The Normalized Manhattan Metric
Differential privacy provides indistinguishability between databases differing in a sin-
gle individual, but the level of distinguishability is independent from the actual value
in those databases. Consider for example a database with salary information, and two
adjacent databases x ∼i x′ (∼i denoting that they differ only in the value of the i-th
individual) with x[i] = v, x′[i] = v′. A differentially private mechanism offers dis-
tinguishability level ε(x, x′) = , independently from v, v′. This means that when
v = 0, v′ = 1M, the indistinguishability level between x, x′ will be the same as in
the case v = 20K, v′ = 20.001K.
One might expect, however, to have better protection in the second case, since the
change in the individual’s data is insignificant. Being insensitive to such small changes
seems a reasonable privacy requirement since many queries (e.g. sum, average, etc) are
themselves insensitive to small perturbations. The equal treatment of values is particu-
larly problematic when we are obliged to use a “weak” , due to a high sensitivity. In
this case, all values are only guaranteed to be weakly protected, while we could expect
that at least close values would still enjoy high protection.
The normalized Manhattan metric d˜1 expresses exactly this idea. Databases dif-
fering in a single value have distance at most 1, but the distance can be substantially
smaller for small modifications of values, offering higher protection in those cases. The
Manhattan metric d1 on Vn and its normalized version d˜1 are defined as:8 d1(x, x′) =∑n
i=1 dV(x[i], x
′[i]) and d˜1(x, x′) =
d1(x,x
′)
dV(V) . Similarly to differential privacy, we use
a scaled version d˜1 of the metric, to properly adjust the distinguishability level.
Concerning the operational characterizations of Section 3, the hiding functions and
neighborhoods suitable for this metric are:
φi,w = x[
w(x[i])/i] for w : V → V Ni,V (x) = {x[v/i] | v ∈ V }
Φ1 = {φi,w | i ∈ 1..n, w : V → V} N1 = {Ni,V (x) | x ∈ Vn, i ∈ 1..n, V ⊆ V}
A hiding function φi,w replaces the value of individual i by applying an arbitrary sub-
stitution of values w (instead of replacing with a fixed value as φi,v does). Moreover,
for the adversary, knowing Ni,V (x) means that he knows the values of all individuals
in the database but i, and moreover he knows that the value of i lies within V . Note that
Φh ⊂ Φ1 and Nh ⊂ N1. We show that Φ1,N1 are “canonical”.
Proposition 2. Φ1,N1 are maximally tight wrt both d1, d˜1.
From Theorem 3, we conclude that d˜1-privacy is equivalent to requiring that the
adversary’s posterior distributions with or without hiding i’s value should be at most
2d˜1(φi,w) distant. Since d˜1(φi,w) ≤ 1, hiding the individual’s value in any way has
small effect on the adversary’s conclusions. But if i’s value is replaced by one close
to it, d˜1(φi,w) can be much lower than 1, meaning that the effect on the adversary’s
conclusions is even smaller.
8 Note that in the differential privacy literature, the d1 distance is often used on histograms.
This metric is closely related to the standard dh distance on Vn (it depends only on the record
counts), and different than d1 on Vn which depends on the actual values.
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Then, from Theorem 4 we conclude that d˜1-privacy is equivalent to requiring that,
for an informed adversary knowing the value of all individuals but i, and moreover
knowing that i’s value lies in V , his conclusions differ from his initial knowledge by
at most dV(V )dV(V) . This difference is at most , but can be much smaller if values in V
are close to each other, meaning that for an adversary who knows i’s value with high
accuracy, the gain is even smaller.
Intuitively, d˜1-privacy offers a stronger notion of privacy than dh-privacy:
Proposition 3. d˜1 ≤ dh, thus d˜1-privacy implies dh-privacy.
Since distances in d˜1 can be smaller than those in dh, the sensitivity of a query wrt
d˜1 is in general greater than the sensitivity wrt dh, which means that to achieve d˜1-
privacy we need to apply more noise. However, for a general class of queries, it turns
out that the two sensitivities coincide.
Definition 8. A query f belongs to the family C iff dR(f(x), f(x′)) ≤ dV(x[i], x′[i]) for
all i ∈ 1..n, x ∼i x′ ∈ Vn, and moreover ∃x ∼i x′ ∈ Vn such that dR(f(x), f(x′)) =
dV(V).
Proposition 4. Let f ∈ C. The sensitivity of f wrt both dh, dR and d˜1, dR is dV(V).
Intuitively, the class C contains queries for which the sensitivity is obtained for
values that are maximally distant. For those queries, using the Truncated Geometric
mechanism we can achieve a notion of privacy stronger than differential privacy using
the same amount of noise!
Results About Some Common Queries. We now focus to some commonly used queries,
namely the sum, average and p-percentile queries. Note that other commonly used
queries such as the max, min and median queries are specific cases of the p-percentile
query. In the following, we assume that the universe is V = q[0..k]∅ with metric dR,
and take X = Vn \ {〈∅, . . . ,∅〉}, that is we exclude the empty database so that the
queries can be always defined.
For these queries we obtain two results: first, we show that they belong to the C
family, which means that we can achieve d˜1-privacy via the TG mechanism, using
the same amount of noise that we would need for standard differential privacy.
Proposition 5. The sum, avg, p-perc queries belong to C.
More interestingly, we can show that the Truncated Geometric mechanism is in fact
universally optimal wrt d˜1 for such queries.
Theorem 11. The sum, avg and p-perc queries are all uniformly qk-sensitive wrt d˜1, dR.
Corollary. TG/qk is f -d˜1-optimal for f ∈ {sum, avg, p-perc},  > 0.
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5.2 The Manhattan Metric
In the previous section, we used the normalized Manhattan metric d˜1, obtaining a
strong privacy notion that protects an individual’s value, while offering even stronger
protection for small changes in an individual’s value. This however, requires at least as
much noise as standard differential privacy.
On the other hand, there are applications in which a complete protection of an indi-
vidual’s value is not required. This happens, for instance, in situations when the actual
value is not sensitive, but knowing it with high accuracy might allow an adversary to
identify the individual. Consider for example a database with the individuals’ birth-
day, or the registration date and time to some social network. This information, by
itself, might not be considered private, however knowing such information with minute-
accuracy could easily allow to identify an individual. In such situations we might wish
to protect only the accuracy of the value, thus achieving privacy with less noise and
offering more accurate results.
This can be achieved by the Manhattan metric d1 (without normalization). This
metric might assign a level of distinguishability higher than  for adjacent databases,
thus the privacy guarantees could be weaker than those of -differential privacy. How-
ever, adjacent databases with small changes in value will be highly protected, thus an
adversary cannot infer an individual’s value with accuracy.
Similarly to the previous section, we can obtain characterizations of d1-privacy us-
ing the same hiding functions Φ1 and neighborhoods N1. The only difference is that
d1(φi,w) and d1(Ni,V ) can be now higher than , offering weaker protection. How-
ever, when the adversary already knows i’s value with high accuracy, meaning that
values in V are close to each other, it is guaranteed that his knowledge will increase
by a small factor (possibly even smaller than ), ensuring that he cannot infer the value
with even higher accuracy.
Note that the sensitivity of a query can be substantially lower wrt d1 than wrt dh.
For example, the sum query is 1-sensitive wrt d1 but qr-sensitive wrt dh. This means
that the noise we need to add could be substantially lower, offering better utility at the
expense of lower privacy, but still sufficient for a given application.
Example 1. Consider a database containing the registration date on some social net-
work, expressed as the number of days since Jan 1, 2000. We want to privately release
the earliest registration date among individuals satisfying some criteria. A registration
date itself is not considered sensitive, however from the result of the query it should
be impossible to infer whether a particular individual belongs to that set. Since values
can range between 0 and approximately 5.000, the sensitivity of the min query wrt dh
is 5.000, while wrt d1 it is only 1. By using dh we protect (up to the intended level )
an individual’s registration date within the whole range of values, while by using 5d1
we provide the intended protection only within a radius of 5 days. More precisely: in
the first case two adjacent databases will always have distinguishability level , while
in the second case such level of protection is guaranteed only if the individual’s reg-
istration date differs by at most 5 days in the two databases (if they differ more the
distinguishability level will increase proportionally). The second case, of course, offers
less privacy, but, depending on the application, confusion within 5 days can be enough
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Fig. 3. Utility for various values of 
to prevent an individual from being identified. On the other hand, the trade-off with
utility can be much more favorable in the second case: In Figure 1 we show the utility
of a Laplace mechanism for both metrics, in terms of (α, δ)-usefulness (meaning that
the mechanism reports a result within distance α from the real value with probability
at least 1− δ).9 Clearly, 5d1-privacy gives acceptable utility while dh-privacy renders
the result almost useless.
Finally, the optimality result from the previous section also holds for d1.
Theorem 12. The sum, avg and p-perc queries are all uniformly 1-sensitive wrt d1, dR.
Corollary. TG is f -d1-optimal for f ∈ {sum, avg, p-perc},  > 0.
6 Privacy in Other Contexts
6.1 Smart Meters
A smart meter is a device that records the consumption of electrical energy at poten-
tially very short time intervals, and transmits the information to the utility provider, thus
offering him the capability to monitor consumption accurately and almost in real-time.
The Problem. Although smart meters can help improving energy management, they
create serious privacy threats: By analyzing accurate consumption data, thanks to appli-
ance signature libraries it is possible to identify which electric devices are being used
[15]. It has even been shown that, depending on the granularity of measurement and
the resolution of data, it is possible to deduce what TV channels, and which movies are
being watched [16].
Several papers addressed the privacy problems of smart metering in the recent past.
The solution proposed in [17] is based on the use of techniques of (standard) differential
privacy in order to send sanitized sums of the readings over some period of time (e.g.
an hour, a day, a month) to the service provider. Since this solution is tailored to the use
of smart metering for billing purposes, the noise added is assumed to be positive.
9 Using Bayesian utility leads to similar results.
16
The Model. For the sake of generality, we assume here that the noise could be of any
kind (not necessarily positive). We can regard the readings over the period [1..n] as
a tuple x ∈ Vn, so that x[i] represents the reading at the time i. Since [17] uses the
standard differential privacy framework, the distinguishability metric on these tuples is
assumed to be the Hamming distance, and therefore the privacy mechanism is tuned
to protect the value of x[i], regardless of whether the variation of this value is small
or large. However, the solution proposed in [17] is general and can be adapted to a
different distinguishability metric.
We argue that for the case of smart meters, the problem that derives from the ex-
treme accuracy of the readings can be addressed with limited noise by adopting a metric
that is sensitive also to the distance between values, and not only to the change of the
value for a reading x[i]. The reason is the same as illustrated in previous section: if
we want to protect small variations in the reading of x[i], it is not a good idea to tune
the sensitivity on the difference between the extremes values, because we would end
up introducing a lot of noise. In fact, the experiments in [16] are performed on actual
smart meters that are in the process of being deployed. These meters send readings to
the service provider every 2 seconds. The solution proposed in [17] offers good privacy
guarantees by completely protecting each measurement. However, such a definition is
too strong if reporting values at short intervals is a requirement. With standard differen-
tial privacy, we cannot hope to fully protect each measurement without introducing too
much noise. On the other hand, using a more relaxed metric, we can at least provide a
meaningful privacy guarantee by protecting the accuracy of the values. Some privacy
will still be lost, but the attacks described above where the individual’s behaviour is
completely disclosed, will be prevented.
The Manhattan distance d1 on Vn, however, is not suitable to model the privacy
problem we have here: in fact d1 is suitable to protect an individual x[i] and its value,
while here we want to protect all the values at the same time. This is because the ad-
versary, i.e., the service provider, already knows an approximation of all values. Note
the difference from the case of Section 5: there, the canonical adversary knows all exact
values except x[i], and for x[i] he only knows an approximate value. (In the case of
standard differential privacy, the canonical adversary knows all values except x[i], and
for x[i] he does not even know an approximate value.)
The suitable distance, in this case, is the maximum distance between components,
d∞. In fact, we should consider x, x′ “indistinguishable enough” (i.e. d(x, x′) ≤ δ,
for a certain δ) if and only if for each component i, x[i], x′[i] are “indistinguishable
enough” (i.e. d(x[i], x′[i]) ≤ δ, for the same δ). It is easy to see that the only distance
that satisfies this property is d(x, x′) = d∞(x, x′) = maxi dV(x[i], x′[i]).
Example 2. We illustrate the application our method to distort the digital signature of
a tv program. The grey line in Fig. 4(a) represents the energy consumption of the first
5 minutes of Star Trek 11 [15]. The black line is (the approximation of) the signature
produced by a smart meter that reports the true readings every 10 seconds (the samples
are represented by the dots). The blue and the magenta dots in 4(b) are obtained by
adding laplacian noise to the true readings, with  values .1 and .5 respectively. As we
can see, especially in the case of  = .5, the signature is not recognizable.
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Fig. 4. Digital signature of a tv program (a) and its noisy reporting (b).
Concerning the characterization results, we use hiding functions substituting the
value of all readings. Moreover, we use neighborhoods modelling an adversary that
knows all readings with some accuracy, i.e. knows that each reading i lies within Vi.
Φ∞ = {φ1,w1 ◦ . . . ◦ φn,wn | wi : V → V ∀i ∈ 1..n}
N{Vi} = {〈v1, . . . , vn〉 | vi ∈ Vi, i ∈ 1..n}
N∞ = {N{Vi} | Vi ⊆ V, i ∈ 1..n}
We can show that Φ∞,N∞ are maximally tight.
Finally, we show that TG is universally optimal for avg and p-perc.
Theorem 13. The avg and p-perc queries are both uniformly 1-sensitive wrt d∞, dR.
Corollary. TG is f -d∞-optimal for f ∈ {avg, p-perc},  > 0.
6.2 Geolocation
In this subsection we briefly describe an application of our framework to privacy-aware
location-based systems. We refer to [18] for more details.
Privacy notions have been already studied in previous works. Some of these works
[19,20,21] propose the use of the expectation of distance error of the attacker as the way
to quantify the privacy offered by a mechanism. Others works [22,23,24] rely on the
well-known concept of k-anonymity. The notion of relevance is also used to measure
location privacy in [25]. A strong advantage of the use of d-privacy as privacy notion is
that it abstracts from the side-knowledge of the attacker.
The Problem. In several situations it is desirable to know the location of an individual
or a group of individuals in order to provide a service. For instance: In census-based
statistics, to determine the population density in certain areas, in transportation industry,
to estimate the average number of people who need to travel between two given stations,
and in smartphone applications, to obtain points of interest nearby such as restaurants.
18
Due to privacy concerns, an individual may refuse to disclose his exact location to
the service provider. Nevertheless, he may be willing to reveal approximate location in-
formation.It is worth noting that for several location-based systems it is usually enough
to obtain an approximate location to be able to provide an accurate service. Note how-
ever, that in order to guarantee a non-negligible level of privacy, the random location
cannot be generated naively. Therefore, if we want to develop a method to randomize
location coordinates, we have to understand what kind of privacy the user expects to
have, and how much information he is willing to reveal.
The Model. In this scenario, the privacy level depends on the accuracy with which an
attacker can guess an individual’s location from the reported one. We will therefore aim
for a distance-dependent notion of privacy, requiring points that are close in distance to
each other to be indistinguishable from the attacker’s point of view. Our method will
still allow the service provider to distinguish between points that are far from each other.
We consider the problem of geolocation on the Euclidean plane, which is a good
approximation of the Earth surface when the area is not “too large”. In this scenario,
possible locations of an individual will be modeled with a set X ⊆ R2, and possible
reported values will be represented by a set Z ⊆ R2. The metric dX used in this context
will be the Euclidean distance d2.
Concerning the characterizations of Section 3, any function φ : R2 → R2 can
be used as a hiding function. Moreover, a neighborhood can be any region N ⊆ R2,
modelling an informed adversary who knows that the user is located within N . Hence
we take Φ2 = R2 → R2 and N2 = 2R2 , both of which are maximally tight wrt d2.
In order to obtain a mechanism which satisfies d2-privacy, we can use the Laplace
mechanism L on R2 mentioned in Section 4.1, that is, the one described by the pdf
D(x)(z) =
2
2pi e
−d2(x,z) x, z ∈ R2. The results in Section 4.1 ensure that such
mechanism satisfies d2-privacy.
7 Conclusion
Starting from the observation that differential privacy requires that the distinguishabil-
ity of two databases depends on their Hamming distance, we have explored the conse-
quences of extending this principle to arbitrary metrics. In this way we have obtained a
rich framework suitable to model a large variety of privacy problems, and in domains
other than statistical databases. Furthermore, even in statistical databases applications,
whenever the privacy concern is related to disclosing small variations in the values
of the individuals (rather than large ones), then our framework allows a more precise
calibration of the noise necessary for achieving the intended level of privacy, and this
results, in general, in a better utility than the one achievable under the constraint of
standard differential privacy. We have investigated the trade-off between privacy and
utility in this extended setting, and it turns out changing the metric has considerable
implications on the existence of universally optimal mechanisms. In particular, for the
Manhattan distance, the normalized Manhattan distance, and the max distance it is pos-
sible to define universally optimal mechanisms for several common queries like the
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sum, the average, and the percentile. This contrast sharply with the case of standard dif-
ferential privacy, where universally optimal mechanisms exist only for counting queries.
Finally, we have shown the applicability of our framework to various privacy problems
in different domains, including smart meters and geolocation.
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A Proofs of Section 3
Proposition 1. If dX ≤ dX ′ (point-wise) then dX -privacy implies dX ′-privacy.
Proof. Trivial, since dP(K(x),K(x′)) ≤ dX (x, x′) ≤ dX ′(x, x′). uunionsq
The following simple lemma states that bounding dP is equivalent to the usual for-
mulation of bounding the ratio between probabilities.
Lemma 1. Let µ1, µ2 be probability measures on Z . Then
dP(µ1, µ2) ≤ b iff ∀Z ∈ FZ : e−bµ2(Z) ≤ µ1(Z) ≤ ebµ2(Z)
Proof. iff) We have | ln µ1(Z)µ2(Z) | ≤ dP(µ1, µ2) ≤ b, hence −b ≤ ln
µ1(Z)
µ2(Z)
≤ b, which
implies e−b ≤ µ1(Z)µ2(Z) ≤ eb. if) We have that | ln
µ1(Z)
µ2(Z)
| is bounded from above by b, but
dP(µ1, µ2) is the least such bound hence dP(µ1, µ2) ≤ b. uunionsq
The following Lemma shows the usefulness of tight chains.
Lemma 2. Let x1, . . . , xn be a tight chain. If K satisfies dX -privacy on all adjacent
elements of the chain, then it also satisfies it for x1, xn. That is
dP(K(xi),K(xi+1)) ≤ dX (xi, xi+1) ∀1 ≤ i < n
implies dP(K(x1),K(xn)) ≤ dX (x1, xn).
Proof. Using the fact that dP is itself a metric, we have
dP(K(x1),K(xn)) ≤
∑n−1
i=1 dP(K(xi),K(xi+1)) triangle ineq. for dP
≤∑n−1i=1 dX (xi, xi+1) hypothesis
= dX (x1, xn) tightness
uunionsq
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Theorem 3. Let Φ be a set of hiding functions. If K satisfies dX -privacy then for all
φ ∈ Φ, all priors pi on X , and all Z ∈ FZ :
dP(σ1, σ2) ≤ 2 dX (φ) where σ1 = Bayes(pi,K,Z) and σ2 = Bayes(pi,K ◦φ,Z)
If Φ is maximally tight then the converse also holds.
Proof. Assume that K satisfies dX -privacy and let pi be a prior, φ ∈ Φ and Z ∈ FZ .
We need to show that
∀x ∈ X : e−2dX (φ)σ1(x) ≤ σ2(x) ≤ e2dX (φ)σ1(x)
(then conclude by applying Lemma 1). Let x ∈ X , we have:
σ2(x)
=
(K ◦ φ)(x)(Z)pi(x)∑
x′∈X (K ◦ φ)(x′)(Z)pi(x′)
def. of Bayes
=
K(φ(x))(Z)pi(x)∑
x′∈X K(φ(x′))(Z)pi(x′)
≤ e
dX (x,φ(x))K(x)(Z)pi(x)∑
x′∈X e−dX (x
′,φ(x′))K(x′)(Z)pi(x′)
dX -privacy
≤ e
dX (φ)K(x)pi(x)(Z)
e−dX (φ)
∑
x′∈X K(x′)(Z)pi(x′)
dX (x, φ(x)) ≤ dX (φ)
≤ e2dX (φ)σ1(x) def. of Bayes
and symmetrically for σ2(x) ≥ e−2dX (φ)σ1(x).
For the opposite direction, assume thatΦ is maximally tight (Def 2), that dP(σ1, σ2) ≤
2dX (φ) holds for all pi, φ, Z, but dX -privacy is violated for some x, x′ ∈ X . From Def 2,
there exist a tight maximal Φ-chain x˜ from x to x′. Then from Lemma 2, we get that
dX -privacy is also violated for some adjacent xi, xi+1 in the chain, that is:
K(xi)(Z) > e
dX (xi,xi+1)K(xi+1)(Z) for some Z (2)
We fix Z to the one above. Since x˜ is a maximal Φ-chain, there exists φ ∈ Φ such that
φ(xi) = xi+1, φ(xi+1) = xi and dX (xi, xi+1) = dX (φ). Fixing this φ, we define a
function f : P(X )→ R as follows:
f(pi) =
∑
x′∈X K(x
′)(Z)pi(x′)∑
x′∈X K(φ(x
′))(Z)pi(x′)
Let δ(x) denote the Dirac measure assigning probability 1 to x, from (2) we have that
f(δ(xi)) =
K(xi)(Z)
K(xi+1)(Z)
> e−dX (xi,xi+1)
f(δ(xi+1)) =
K(xi+1)(Z)
K(xi)(Z)
< e−dX (xi,xi+1)
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From the continuity of f on the line between δ(xi) and δ(xi+1), there exists a prior
pi = tδ(xi)+(1−t)δ(xi+1), t ∈ (0, 1), such that f(pi) = e−dX (xi,xi+1). Note that since
pi is distinct from δ(xi), δ(xi+1), it holds that pi(xi) > 0, pi(xi+1) > 0. By applying the
hypothesis for this pi, we get
dP(σ1, σ2) ≤ 2dX (φ) ⇒
σ1(xi) ≤ e2dX (φ)σ2(xi) (Lemma 1)⇒
K(xi)(Z)pi(xi)∑
x′∈X K(x′)(Z)pi(x′)
≤ e2dX (φ) K(φ(xi))(Z)pi(xi)∑
x′∈X K(φ(x′))(Z)pi(x′)
(Def. of σ1, σ2)⇒
K(xi)(Z) ≤ e2dX (φ)f(pi)K(φ(xi))(Z) (pi(xi) > 0)⇒
K(xi)(Z) ≤ edX (xi,xi+1)K(xi+1)(Z)
which contradicts (2). uunionsq
Theorem 4. Let N ⊆ 2X . If K satisfies dX -privacy then for all N ∈ N , all priors pi
on X , and all Z ∈ FZ :
dP(pi|N , σ|N ) ≤ dX (N) where σ = Bayes(pi,K,Z)
If N is maximally tight then the converse also holds.
Proof. Assume that K satisfies dX -privacy. We fix some N ∈ N , pi ∈ P(X ), Z ∈
FZ and let σ = Bayes(pi,K,Z). Note that pi|N , σ|N are distributions on N . From
Lemma 1 we need to show that
e−dX (N)pi|N (x) ≤ σ|N (x) ≤ edX (N)pi|N (x) ∀x ∈ N
Fixing some x ∈ N , we have:
σ|N (x) = σ(x|N) def. of σ|N
=
σ(x)∑
x′∈N σ(x′)
=
pi(x)K(x)(Z)∑
x′∈N pi(x′)K(x′)(Z)
def. of Bayes
≤ pi(x)K(x)(Z)∑
x′∈N pi(x′)e−dX (x,x
′)K(x)(Z)
dX -privacy
≤ edX (N) pi(x)∑
x′∈N pi(x′)
dX (x, x
′) ≤ dX (N)
= edX (N)pi|N (x)
and symmetrically for σ|N (x) ≥ e−dX (N)pi|N (x).
For the opposite direction, assume thatN is maximally tight (Def 3) but dX -privacy
is violated for some x, x′ ∈ X . From Def 3, there exist a tight N -chain x˜ from x to x′.
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Then from Lemma 2, we get that dX -privacy is also violated for some adjacent xi, xi+1
in the chain, that is:
K(xi)(Z) > e
dX (xi,xi+1)K(xi+1)(Z) for some Z (3)
Since x˜ is anN -chain, there existN ∈ N such that {xi, xi+1} ⊆ N and dX (xi, xi+1) =
dX (N). We define a prior distribution pit(x) as
pit(x) =

t x = xi
1− t x = xi+1
0 otherwise
Using that prior for t > 0, we fix some Z ∈ FZ and let σt = Bayes(pit,K, Z). We
have
σt|N (xi) ≤ edX (N)pit|N (xi) (hypoth., Lemma 1)⇒
σt(xi) ≤ edX (N)pit(xi) (pit(N) = σt(N) = 1)⇒
pit(xi)K(xi)(Z)∑
x′∈X pit(x′)K(x′)(Z)
≤ edX (N)pit(xi) (def. of Bayes)⇒
tK(xi)(Z)
tK(xi)(Z) + (1− t)K(xi+1)(Z) ≤ e
dX (N)t (def. of pit)⇒
K(xi)(Z)
tK(xi)(Z) + (1− t)K(xi+1)(Z) ≤ e
dX (N) (t > 0)⇒
K(xi)(Z)
tK(xi)(Z) + (1− t)K(xi+1)(Z) ≤ e
dX (xi,xi+1) (dX (xi, xi+1) = dX (N))
The above inequality holds for all t > 0. Finally, taking the limt→0 on both sides we
get
K(xi)(Z) ≤ edX (xi,xi+1)K(xi+1)(Z)
which is a contradiction of (3). uunionsq
B Proofs of Section 4
Fact 5. Assume that f is∆-sensitive wrt dX , dY andH satisfies dY-privacy. ThenH ◦f
satisfies ∆dX -privacy.
Proof. Assume that H satisfies dY-privacy and let x, x′ ∈ X . We have:
dP((H ◦ f)(x), (H ◦ f)(x′)) = dP(H(f(x)), H(f(x′)))
≤ dY(f(x), f(x′)) dY-privacy
≤ ∆dX (x, x′) ∆-sensitivity
uunionsq
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Theorem 6. Assume that f is uniformly ∆-sensitive wrt dX , dY . Then H satisfies dY-
privacy if and only if H ◦ f satisfies ∆dX -privacy.
Proof. The only if part is Fact 5. For the if part, fix some y, y′ ∈ Y and let y1, . . . , yn be
the tight∆-expansive chain from y to y′ guaranteed to exist by the definition of uniform
∆-sensitivity. Then, for all 1 ≤ i < n, since yi, yi+1 are ∆-expansive, there exist
x ∈ f−1(yi), x′ ∈ f−1(yi+1) such that dY(f(x), f(x′)) = ∆dX (x, x′)
Hence
dP(H(yi), H(yi+1)) = dP(H(f(x)), H(f(x′)))
≤ ∆dX (x, x′) ∆dX -privacy of H ◦ f
= dY(yi, yi+1)
So H satisfies dY-privacy for all adjacent elements in the chain, hence from Lemma 2
it also satisfies it for y, y′. uunionsq
The following result is standard, we provide the proof for completeness.
Fact 7 ([14]). Any Laplace mechanism from (Y, dY) to Z satisfies dY-privacy.
Proof. For the pdf describing the mechanism we have:
D(y)(z) = λ(z) e−dY(y,z)
≤ λ(z) e−(dY(y′,z)−dY(y,y′)) triangle ineq.
= edY(y,y
′)λ(z) e−dY(y
′,z)
= edY(y,y
′)D(y′)(z)
for all y, y′ ∈ Y, z ∈ Z . The above inequality can be directly extended from the pdf to
the measures, thus we conclude that the mechanism satisfies dY-privacy. uunionsq
B.1 Proofs of Section 4.2
To prove our sufficient condition for optimality (Theorem 10), we introduce the concept
of a mechanism being optimal not wrt a specific query, but wrt the metric of its input
domain. Let H(dY) be the set of all mechanisms H : Y → Z (for any Z) satisfying
dY-privacy.
Definition 9. A mechanism H ∈ H(dY) is dY-optimal iff U(H,pi, l) ≥ U(H ′, pi, l) for
all H ′ ∈ H(dY), all priors pi and all loss functions l.
Notice the difference between dY-optimal and f -dX -optimal; the latter refers to a
specific query. The two notions can be related in the case of uniformly sensitive queries
by the following result:
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Proposition 6. Assume that f is uniformly ∆-sensitive wrt dX , dY . Then H is f -∆dX -
optimal iff it is dY-optimal.
Proof. From uniform ∆-sensitivity and Theorem 6, we get that H(dY) = Hf (∆dX ).
Then the result follows directly from the definition of optimality (Definitions 7,9). uunionsq
The importance of the induced graph ∼f in optimality results comes from the fact
that f is always uniformly sensitive wrt the metric induced by ∼f .
Proposition 7. Let f be a query with induced graph ∼f , and let df be the metric in-
duced by ∼f . Then f is uniformly 1-sensitive wrt dh, df .
Proof. Let x, x′ ∈ X and let n = dh(x, x′). We first need to show that f is 1-sensitive
wrt dh, df , that is df (f(x), f(x′)) ≤ n. Since dh is induced by ∼h, there exists a ∼h-
path x1 . . . , xn such that x = x1, x′ = xn. By definition of ∼f we have that f(xi) ∼f
f(xi+1), thus f(x1), . . . , f(xn) is a ∼f -path of length n from f(x) to f(x′). Since
df (f(x), f(x
′)) is the length of the shortest such path, we have that df (f(x), f(x′)) ≤
n.
For the “uniformly” part, let y, y′ ∈ Y and n = df (y, y′). We need to show that
there exists a tight and 1-expansive chain from y to y′.
Since df is induced by ∼f , there exist a ∼f -path y˜ = y1, . . . , yn such that y =
y1, y
′ = yn This implies that df (yi, yi+1) = 1 and thus df (y˜) = n = df (y, y′) so the
chain is tight.
Moreover, from the definition of ∼f we have that there exist x ∼h x′ such that
f(x) = yi, f(x
′) = yi+1, so dh(x, x′) = 1 which means that yi, yi+1 are 1-expansive,
and this happens for all 1 ≤ i < n so the chain is 1-expansive. uunionsq
We can now show the optimality of TG with input q[0..k] wrt the dR metric,
independently from any query.
Proposition 8. Let Yq = q[0..k]. The TG mechanism with input Yq is dR-optimal for
all  > 0.
Proof. FixY = 0..k andYq = q[0..k] for some k ∈ N, q > 0, and let TG(Y), TG(Yq)
denote the Truncated Geometric mechanisms with input Y,Yq respectively.
From Theorem 8 we known that TG(Y) is f -dh-optimal when f is a counting
query. For counting queries, df (the metric that corresponds to their induced graph) and
dR coincide, thus from Prop 7 we get that f is uniformly 1-sensitive wrt dh, dR. Then
from Prop 6 we have that that TG(Y) is dR-optimal. This mechanism has pdf
D(y)(z) = λ(z) e
− dR(y,z) λ(z) =
{
e
e+1 z ∈ {0, k}
e−1
e+1 0 < z < k
We now show that TG(Yq) is also dR-optimal. The metric spaces (Y, dR) and (Yq,  1qdR)
are isometric. So we can obtain a mechanism D′ with input Yq by replacing i with qi
and dR with  1qdR). The pdf of this mechanism is:
D′(y)(z) = λ(z) e
− 1q dR(y,z) λ(z) =
{
e
e+1 z ∈ {0, qk}
e−1
e+1 0 < z < k
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Due to the isometry, D satisfies dR-privacy iff D′ satisfies 
1
qdR-privacy, thus (from
the optimality of D) it follows that D′ is 
1
qdR-optimal for all  > 0.
Finally we define:
D′′ = D
′
q
From the optimality of D′ we get that D
′′
 is (q)
1
qdR-optimal, i.e. it is dR-optimal.
This concludes the proof, since D′′ is exactly the pdf of TG(Yq). uunionsq
The results above bring us directly to our sufficient condition.
Theorem 10. Let Y = q[0..k] and assume that f : X → Y is uniformly ∆-sensitive
wrt dX , dR. Then the TG mechanism with input Y is f -∆dX -optimal.
Proof. Direct corollary of Prop 8 and Prop 6. uunionsq
C Proofs of Section 5
Proposition 2. Φ1,N1 are maximally tight wrt both d1, d˜1.
Proof. We first consider d1. Let x, x′ ∈ Vn, we show that there exist a tight chain from
x to x′ that is both a maximal Φ1-chain and a maximalN1-chain. We recursively create
a chain x1, . . . , xn+1 from x to x′ by modifying one element at a time:
x1 = x
xi+1 = xi[
x′[i]/i] i ∈ 1..n
It is easy to see that d1(x, x′) =
∑n
i=1 d1(xi, xi+1) so the chain is tight wrt d1.
Fix any i ∈ 1..n and let w : V → V defined as:
w(v) =

x′[i] if v = x[i]
x[i] if v = x′[i]
v otherwise
For the hiding function φi,w ∈ Φ1 it holds that
φi,w(xi) = xi+1 φi,w(xi+1) = xi d1(xi, xi+1) = d1(φi,w)
hence the chain is a maximal Φ1-chain.
Moreover, let V = {x[i], x′[i]}. For the neighborhood Ni,V (xi) ∈ N1 it holds that
{xi, xi+1} ⊆ Ni,V (xi) d1(xi, xi+1) = d1(Ni,V (xi))
so the chain is a maximal N1-chain.
The case of d˜1 is similar, since it is a scaled version of d1. uunionsq
Proposition 3. d˜1 ≤ dh, thus d˜1-privacy implies dh-privacy.
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Proof. Fix x, x′ ∈ Vn and let I = {i ∈ 1..n | x[i] 6= x[i′]}. Then
d˜1(x, x
′) =
∑
i∈I dV(x[i], x[i
′])
dV(V) ≤
∑
i∈I dV(V)
dV(V) = |I| = dh(x, x
′)
uunionsq
We continue by introducing a relaxed version of the concept of maximalN -tightness
(Def 3), calledN -tightness, by simply dropping the requirement dX (xi, xi+1) = dX (N)
from Def 3.
Definition 10. Let N ⊆ 2X . A chain x˜ is called an N -chain iff for every step i there
exists N ∈ N such that {xi, xi+1} ⊆ N . Then N is called tight wrt dX iff ∀x, x′ ∈ X
there exists a tight N -chain from x to x′.
We can now show the (maximal wrt dh, simple wrt d1, d˜1) tightness of Nh, which
will be useful later on.
Proposition 9. Nh is maximally tight wrt dh and tight wrt both d1, d˜1.
Proof. Let x, x′ ∈ Vn. We need to show that there exists a tight (also maximal in the
case of dh) Nh-chain from x to x′. We recursively create a chain x1, . . . , xn+1 from x
to x′ by modifying one element at a time:
x1 = x
xi+1 = xi[
x′[i]/i] i ∈ 1..n
It is easy to see that d(x, x′) =
∑n
i=1 d(xi, xi+1), for all d ∈ {dh, d1, d˜1}, so the chain
is tight wrt all three metrics. Moreover, we have that {xi, xi+1} ⊆ Ni(xi) so the chain
is an Nh-chain wrt all metrics.
For dh, it also holds that dh(xi, xi+1) = dh(Ni(xi)) = 1, so the chain is a maximal
Nh-chain wrt dh. uunionsq
We continue with a lemma that facilitates proofs of ∆-sensitivity by reducing the
pairs of secrets x, x′ that one needs to check.
Lemma 3. Let N ⊆ 2X be tight (Def 10) and assume:
dY(f(x), f(x
′)) ≤ ∆dX (x, x′) ∀N ∈ N , x, x′ ∈ N
Then f is ∆-sensitive wrt dX , dY .
Proof. Fix x, x′ ∈ X , we need to show that dY(f(x), f(x′)) ≤ ∆dX (x, x′). Since N
is tight there exist a tight N -chain x = x1, . . . , xn = x′, such that each step xi, xi+1
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belongs to some set N ∈ N . We have:
dY(f(x), f(x
′))
≤
n−1∑
i=1
dY(f(xi), f(xi+1)) triangle ineq.
≤ ∆
n−1∑
i=1
dX (xi, xi+1) hypoth., xi, xi+1 ∈ N
= ∆dX (x, x
′) tightness of chain
uunionsq
Proposition 4. Let f ∈ C. The sensitivity of f wrt both dh, dR and d˜1, dR is dV(V).
Proof. Let f ∈ C. We first show that f is dV(V)-sensitive wrt both dh, dR and d˜1, dR.
From Prop 9 together with Theorem 3, we only need to show the sensitivity for databases
x, x′ from some set Ni(x) ∈ Nh, i.e. x ∼i x′.
For dh, we have dh(x, x′) = 1, thus
dY(f(x), f(x
′)) ≤ dV(x[i], x′[i]) ≤ dV(V)dh(x, x′)
For d˜1 we have:
dY(f(x), f(x
′)) ≤ dV(x[i], x′[i]) = dV(V)d˜1(x, x′)
Then, for any ∆ < dV(V), f is not ∆-sensitive for neither metric, since from Def 8
there exists x ∼i x′ such that
dY(f(x), f(x
′)) = dV(V) > ∆dh(x, x′)
and similarly for d˜1. uunionsq
Proposition 5. The sum, avg, p-perc queries belong to C.
Proof. The universe is assumed to be V = q[0..k]∅ for some k ∈ N, q > 0. Let
x ∼i x′ ∈ Vn. We first show that dR(f(x), f(x′)) ≤ dV(x[i], x′[i]).
For sum, it is easy to see that
|sum(x), sum(x′)| =

dV(x[i], x
′[i]) x[i] 6= ∅, x′[i] 6= ∅
x′[i] x[i] = ∅
x[i] x′[i] = ∅
Note that x′[i] ≤ dV(x[i], x′[i]) = qr in the case x[i] = ∅ (and similarly for x′[i] =
∅).10
10 It is crucial here that V contains 0, so that v ≤ dV(V) for all non-null v. If 0 6∈ V , we can
achieve a similar result for sum by adapting the way dV treats ∅.
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Consider now f ∈ {avg, p-perc}. From Theorem 13 we know that both queries are
1-sensitive wrt d∞, dR. And since d∞(x, x′) = dV(x[i], x′[i]) we have:
dR(f(x), f(x
′)) ≤ d∞(x, x′) = dV(x[i], x′[i])
Finally, we need to show that there exist x ∼i x′ ∈ Vn such that dR(f(x), f(x′)) =
dV(V) = qk. We construct x = 〈0,∅, . . . ,∅〉, x′ = 〈qk,∅, . . . ,∅〉. These databases
satisfy dR(f(x), f(x′)) = qk for all queries. uunionsq
Theorem 11. The sum, avg and p-perc queries are all uniformly qk-sensitive wrt d˜1, dR.
Proof. First we have to show that the queries are qk-sensitive wrt d˜1, dR. This comes
from Prop 4 and 5, since all queries belong to the family C.
We now show the uniform sensitivity of sum. Let y, y′ ∈ q[0..nk] and assume that
y ≥ y′. It is easy to see that we can construct databases x, x′ such that sum(x) =
y, sum(x′) = y′ and x[i] ≥ x′[i] for all i ∈ 1..n. For x, x′ we have
d1(x, x
′) =
∑
i |x[i]− x′[i]|
= |∑i x[i]| − |∑i x′[i]| x[i] ≥ x′[i]
= dR(sum(x), sum(x
′))
Thus dR(y, y′) = qk d˜1(x, x′), which means that the chain y, y′ is qk-expansive wrt
d˜1.
Finally, for f ∈ {avg, p-perc} let y, y′ ∈ q[0..k]. We construct two databases x, x′
with a single present individual as follows:
x = 〈y,∅, . . . ,∅〉 x′ = 〈y′,∅, . . . ,∅〉
It is easy to see that f(x) = y, f(x′) = y′ and d1(x, x′) = dR(y, y′). Thus dR(y, y′) =
qk d˜1(x, x
′) which means that the chain y, y′ is qk-expansive wrt d˜1. uunionsq
Theorem 12. The sum, avg and p-perc queries are all uniformly 1-sensitive wrt d1, dR.
Proof. Direct consequence of Theorem 11, since d1 = qk d˜1. uunionsq
D Proofs of Section 6
Proposition 10. Φ∞,N∞ are maximally tight wrt d∞.
Proof. Let x, x′ ∈ Vn, and consider the trivial 1-step chain x, x′. This chain is trivially
tight, we need to show that it is both a maximal Φ∞-chain and a maximal N∞-chain.
For each i ∈ 1..n we define a function wi : V → V as:
wi(v) =

x′[i] if v = x[i]
x[i] if v = x′[i]
v otherwise
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For the hiding function φ = φ1,w1 ◦ . . . ◦ φn,wn we have that φ ∈ Φ∞ and moreover:
φ(x) = x′ φ(x′) = x d∞(x, x′) = d∞(φ)
hence the chain is a maximal Φ∞-chain.
Moreover, let Vi = {x[i], x′[i]}, i ∈ 1..n. For the neighborhood N{Vi} ∈ N∞ it
holds that
{x, x′} ⊆ N{Vi} d∞(x, x′) = d∞(N{Vi})
so the chain is a maximal N∞-chain. uunionsq
Theorem 13. The avg and p-perc queries are both uniformly 1-sensitive wrt d∞, dR.
Proof. The universe is assumed to be V = q[0..k]∅ for some k ∈ N, q > 0. The p-
percentile query (0 ≤ p < 100) is defined as p-perc(x) = sort(x)[l] for l = b p100m +
1c, where m is the number of non-null values in x and sort returns a sorted version of
x (after removing the null values). We also define I∅(x) = {i ∈ 1..n | x[i] = ∅}.
We fist show that both queries are 1-sensitive wrt d∞, dR. Let x, x′ ∈ Vn. If
I∅(x) 6= I∅(x′) then x, x′ are maximally distant, i.e. d∞(x, x′) = d∞(Vn) = qk.
Then for both queries it trivially holds that dR(f(x), f(x′)) ≤ qk = d∞(x, x′) since
their range is q[0..k].
It remains to show 1-sensitivity for the case I∅(x) = I∅(x′) = I . For the average
query we have
dR(avg(x), avg(x
′))
=
1
|I| |(
∑
i∈I x[i])− (
∑
i∈I x
′[i])|
=
1
|I| |
∑
i∈I (x[i]− x′[i])|
≤ 1|I|
∑
i∈I |x[i]− x′[i]| subadditivity of | · |
≤ 1|I|
∑
i∈I d∞(x, x
′) |x[i]− x′[i]| ≤ d∞(x, x′)
= d∞(x, x′)
For the p-perc query it holds that p-perc(x) = sort(x)[l] and p-perc(x′) = sort(x′)[l]
for the same l (since I∅(x) = I∅(x′)). Let h, h′ ∈ 1..n such that x[h] = sort(x)[l] and
x′[h′] = sort(x′)[l].
Assume that x[h] ≤ x[h′] (the case x[h] ≥ x[h′] is symmetric). By the definition
of sort, there are at least l elements j ∈ 1..n such that x[j] ≤ x[h] (including h itself).
Moreover, there are at most l − 1 elements j ∈ 1..n such that x′[j] < x′[h′]. Hence,
there exists at least one j ∈ 1..n such that
x[j] ≤ x[h] and x′[j] ≥ x′[h′]
It also holds that |x[i]− x′[i]| ≤ d∞(x, x′), i.e.
x[i]− d∞(x, x′) ≤ x′[i] ≤ x[i] + d∞(x, x′) ∀i ∈ 1..n (4)
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From x[h] ≤ x[h′] and (4) we get
x[h]− d∞(x, x′) ≤ x′[h′]
Moreover, it holds that
x′[h′] ≤ x′[j] ≤ x[j] + d∞(x, x′) ≤ x[h] + d∞(x, x′)
thus
dR(p-perc(x), p-perc(x′)) = |x[h]− x′[h′]| ≤ d∞(x, x′)
For the “uniformly” part, let y, y′ ∈ q[0..k]; we construct x = 〈y,∅, . . . ,∅〉, x′ =
〈y′,∅, . . . ,∅〉, for which it holds that f(x) = y, f(x′) = y′ (for both queries) and
d∞(x, x′) = dR(y, y′).
Note that for p-perc we can construct x, x′ without∅ values with the same property.
However, for the avg query this is not possible; its uniform optimality depends on the
fact that ∅ values are allowed. If ∅ 6∈ V then avg is essentially equivalent to sum,
which is not uniformly optimal wrt d∞, dR. uunionsq
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